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NEW YORK'S ARTICLE 16 AND MULTIPLE
DEFENDANT PRODUCT LIABILITY
LITIGATION: A TIME TO RETHINK THE
IMPACT OF BANKRUPT SHARES ON
JUDGMENT MOLDING
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INTRODUCTION

The precise cost of resolving asbestos-related personal injury
claims,' a nationwide phenomenon unprecedented in scope, 2 is
unknown, although it clearly must be staggering.3 Asbestos
t Attorney with Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal in New York. The author is a
former law clerk to the Honorable Charles H. Tenney, United States District Judge
for the Southern District of New York.
1 Given its excellent fire-retardant capability, asbestos was prevalent in the
construction trade from the 1940s through the early 1970s. For nearly half a
century, hundred of thousands of people have used asbestos in various settings
ranging from refineries, shipyards, and powerhouses to office building and
residential construction. This has lead to unparalleled mass tort litigation with a
devastating financial impact. See Brian M. DiMasi, The Threshold Level of Proofof
Asbestos Causation: The "Frequency,Regularity and Proximity Test" and a Modified
Summers v. Tice Theory of Burden-Shifting, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 735, 737-39 (1995).
2 The enormity of this litigation and its financial consequences were anticipated
a decade ago:
No litigation in American history has involved as many individual
claimants, been predicated upon the severity of injury, consumed as many
judicial resources, resulted in as much compensation to claimants,
compelled the number of defendants' bankruptcies, or been as lucrative to
lawyers as asbestos litigation. Asbestos litigation has been referred to as
an 'impending disaster'....
Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an
Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1819 (1992).
3 See Christopher Oster, Some Insurers Face Shortfall in Reserves for Costly
Claims Related to Asbestos, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2001, at A4 (citing an A.M. Best
study, which reports that domestic insurers have expended approximately $21
billion, through 2000, on asbestos personal injury litigation, and which estimates
their final cost at $65 billion). The study warns that there is a shortfall, in excess of
$30 billion, in reserves set aside to resolve asbestos-related claims. Id. In addition to
the sums expended by the insurers, there are additional costs paid directly by the
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litigation has dramatically reduced the equity and debt values of
affected companies 4 and forced an enormous number- of
bankruptcies during the past twenty years. 5 The trend seems to
be accelerating, and at least one think tank estimates that the
entire asbestos industry may be headed for bankruptcy in the
near future. 6 Indeed, from February 2000 to February 2002,
more than a dozen companies with asbestos-related liabilities
7
filed for bankruptcy.
Although one effect of the dwindling number of traditional
8
defendants is the search for secondary and tertiary defendants,
a less visible but perhaps more significant effect arises in the
context of judgment molding under Article 16 of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules. 9 Under New York law, all entities
with a potential share of blame in causing plaintiffs' injuries are
included on the verdict sheet, regardless of whether the entity

defendants, which add considerably to the estimated $65 billion total cost to
insurers.
4 One need only review the decline in value of the equity of affected companies
to realize the loss of value to investors. For example, Crown Cork and Seal
("Crown") shares were trading at $20 in 2000 but traded for less than $6 in March
2002. See Crown, Cork & Seal, Stock Quotes and Charts, at http://www.crowncork.
com/investors/indexi.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2002). Crown has suffered this loss
in value, notwithstanding that it has so far avoided bankruptcy; shares of
companies actually in bankruptcy trade at fractions of their pre-filing values. For
example, Owens Coming stock traded at $19 per share at the beginning of January
2000 but traded for $0.75 on October 6, 2001, the day after filing for bankruptcy, see
Owens Coming, Historical Price Lookup, at http://www.owenscorning.com (last
visited Aug. 22, 2002), and Federal Mogul stock traded for nearly $19 at the
beginning of January 2000 but sank to $0.74 on October 2, 2001, the day after filing
for bankruptcy, see Federal Mogul, Historic Stock Quotes, at http://www.
federalmogul.com/investors/index.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2002).
5 See, e.g., In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 999 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1993); In re
Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992); In re Amatex Corp., 97 B.R. 220
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989), affd, 102 B.R. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff/d, 908 F.2d 961 (3d
Cir. 1990); In re Pacor, Inc., 74 B.R. 20 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re UNR Indus., 30 B.R.
609 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1983).
6 See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE U.S.: A NEW
LOOK AT AN OLD ISSUE 50 (2001), availableat http://www.rand.orgpublications/DB/

DB362.0/.
7 See id. at 51 (listing the following examples: Babcock & Wilcox (Feb. 2000);
Pittsburgh Corning (Apr. 2000); Owens Coming (Oct. 2000); Armstrong World
Industries (Dec. 2000); G-1 Holdings (Jan. 2001); W.R. Grace (Apr. 2001); U.S.
Gypsum (June 2001); United States Mineral Products (July 2001)).
8 See Susan Warren, Asbestos Suits Target Makers of Wine, Cars, Soups, Soaps,
WALL ST. J., April 12, 2000, at B1 (discussing rise of claims against non-asbestosproducing defendants).
9 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1600 (McKinney 2001).
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has already settled out of the matter, has been dissolved, or has
received a judgment in bankruptcy. 10 The "[a]llocation among all
potential fault sharers is necessary to determine the proper
equitable share." 1
Under Article 16, entities over whom plaintiffs could not
obtain jurisdiction with due diligence are excludable from the
judgment, thereby enlarging the share the remaining defendants
may ultimately have to pay. 12 In asbestos litigation, New York
courts have concluded that bankrupt parties fall within the
category of "beyond jurisdiction"; thus, since plaintiffs cannot,
with due diligence, obtain jurisdiction over them, the portion of
liability allocated to bankrupt parties has been deemed
excludable when apportioning a final judgment. 13 Depending on
the allocation of fault to bankrupt entities, this can have a
dramatic effect on the judgment entered against the non-settling
defendants.14
The implication of Article 16 for viable defendants (and for
the economy as a whole, to the extent that it is impacted by the
overall financial health of the remaining defendants) is
dramatic. In the initial period of asbestos-related litigation,
lawsuits focused primarily on "traditional" defendants: miners,
10See Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 (N.Y. 1972)
(stating that liability should be distributed in proportion to the tortfeasor's fault);
Gannon Pers. Agency v. City of New York, 394 N.Y.S.2d 5, 18 (1st Dep't 1977)
(finding that excluding a judgment-proof defendant's percentage of fault from an
apportionment of fault among multiple defendants was error); see also Killeen v.
Reinhardt, 419 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (2d Dep't 1979) (holding that the reduction of the
defendant's liability by the share of fault allocable to a tortfeasor no longer being
sued was correct).
11 In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1400 (E.D.N.Y. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (emphasis added).
12 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 2001).
13 See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 798 F. Supp. 940, 956-58
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that bankrupts, as third party defendants over
whom the plaintiff could not have obtained jurisdiction, are beyond the court's
jurisdiction for Article 16 purposes), rev'd on other grounds, 995 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.
1993); In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. at 1404-05 (stating that
bankrupts are beyond the court's jurisdiction for Article 16 purposes), affd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831,
845-46 (2d Cir. 1992) (bankrupts deemed beyond the courts' jurisdiction for Article
16 purposes).
14 See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 798 F. Supp. at 956-59
(finding that although the remaining defendant was actually liable for only 10% of
the harm, the bankrupts and others over whom the court lacked jurisdiction were
liable for 58.5% of the harm, requiring that the sole defendant's 10% share be
increased to 24.1%).
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Currently,

however, an increasing number of defendants fall outside the
scope of these "traditional" defendants. 16 Plaintiffs are now
filing claims against a host of contractors, automotive parts
manufacturers, retailers, insurers, premises owners, and other
"non-traditional" defendants. 17 Many of these new defendants
find themselves in cases where the significant fault sharers are
in bankruptcy. As such, they may be asked to pick up a
substantially greater share of liability than their actual
proportional allocation of fault. The resulting financial burden
on these companies may become severe enough to cause many of
the "new" defendants to file for bankruptcy.
In addition, the increase in bankruptcy filings, coupled with
the perception among plaintiffs' counsel that non-settling
defendants must absorb, in some manner, the bankrupt defendants' share of liability, has resulted in impeding settlements.
There are two principle reasons. First, when a defendant files
for bankruptcy, the settlement funds that the plaintiff ordinarily
anticipates from this defendant are no longer available.' 8
Second, viable defendants are under pressure from plaintiffs'
demands, which are based on the assumption that a non-settling
defendant will absorb in some manner the bankrupts' shares. 19
As the pace of bankruptcy filings increases, the significance of
the issue of whether bankrupt shares are reallocated will surely
20
grow as well.
15 See DiMasi, supra note 1, at 735-44.
16 See Warren, supra note 8, at B1.
17 See id.
18 See Christopher F. Edley & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion Dollar

Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 383, 384 (1993) (explaining that as asbestos litigation
causes major companies to go bankrupt, plaintiffs begin to seek new defendants to
make up for those funds no longer available for settlements); Robert K O'Reilly,
Targeting the Wrong Deep Pocket: Professional Liability Claims in Insurance
Company Insolvencies, 1996 WIs. L. REV. 123, 123-24 (1996) (stating that as
insurance companies have become insolvent, plaintiffs have instead targeted other

"deep pocket" professionals in their lawsuits).
19 See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass
Litigation, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1005 (1993) (explaining that many defendants

were pressured to the point of bankruptcy by increasing numbers of claims and by
having to absorb Johns-Manville Company's portion of liability after it declared
bankruptcy); O'Reilly, supra note 18, at 124 (noting that in the area of insurance
company insolvencies, the remaining defendants-so-called "deep pocket"
professionals-are under pressure to settle).
20 While this Article focuses on the impact of bankruptcy on asbestos litigation,
the analysis is equally relevant to any other litigation involving liability shares
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I.

OVERVIEW OF ARTICLE

16

Article 16 was an integral part of New York tort reform
legislation passed in 1986.21 The legislative aim of Article 16
was to limit the application of traditional joint and several
liability to non-economic damages in personal injury cases,
thereby protecting potential defendants such as municipalities
and other similar "deep pockets" from being held liable for the
full amount of a judgment when their actual percentage of fault
22
was small.
Article 16 forces plaintiffs to sue all alleged tortfeasors or
run the risk of obtaining only a partial recovery. 23 The statute
modifies liability to the extent that a tortfeasor apportioned fifty
percent or less of the fault will only be liable for that apportioned
share.

24

Article 16 provides that where a defendant is held to be no
more than fifty percent liable, that defendant's liability for non25
economic damages cannot exceed its equitable share of liability.
The statute reads, in pertinent part:
[When a verdict or decision in an action or claim for personal
injury is determined in favor of a claimant in an action
involving two or more tortfeasors jointly liable ...and the

attributable to bankrupt entities. If asbestos litigation can be used as a guide,
various defendants in future multi-defendant mass tort cases may very well file for
bankruptcy. Given the growing trend of mass products liability law suits, the
likelihood of this occurring is substantial. See Helen E. Freedman, ProductLiability
Issues In Mass Torts-View From The Bench, 15 TOURO L. REV. 685, 685-86 (1998)
(discussing the sharp rise in mass tort litigation).
21 See Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 182 (N.Y. 2001) (noting
Article 16's legislative goal of benefiting low-fault deep pocket defendants); see also
Paul F. Kirgis, Apportioning Tort Damages in New York: A Method to the Madness,
75 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 427, 433-34 (2001). Of course benefiting low-fault deep pocket
defendants was not the sole legislative goal. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., Nos. 88 Civ. 1286 (PNL) & 88 Civ. 1922 (PNL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10891,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1990) ("The bill.., represents a negotiated compromise
between plaintiffs' and defendants' interests. Some provisions do indeed favor
defendants; others do not. I therefore find no basis for accepting the defendants'
argument that Article 16 was passed to help defendants and must be interpreted in
whatever manner will benefit defendants.") (footnote omitted).
22 See Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 182; Kirgis, supra note 21, at 433-34.
23 See Zakshevsky v. City of New York, 562 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1990) (holding that the plaintiff must establish an inability to obtain
personal jurisdiction before a non-defendant's share of fault will be imposed on the
defendants).
24 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 2001).
25

Id.
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liability of a defendant is found to be fifty percent or less of the
total liability assigned to all persons liable, the liability of such
defendant to the claimant for non-economic loss shall not
exceed that defendant's equitable share determined in
accordance with the relative culpability of each person causing
or contributing to the total liability for non-economic loss ....

26

Article 16, however, remains inapplicable, and thus the
traditional rule of joint and several liability remains in effect for
economic loss, for parties allocated more than fifty percent of the
liability and for defendants who satisfy one or more of the
various exceptions to Article 16.27
II.

ENTITIES BEYOND JURISDICTION

In computing a defendant's equitable share of damages,
courts are directed to the portion of Article 16 which expressly
excludes shares of liability attributed to persons beyond the
jurisdiction of the court. In particular, the statute states that
"the culpable conduct of any person not a party to the action
shall not be considered in determining any equitable share
herein if the claimant proves that with due diligence he or she
was unable to obtain jurisdiction over such person in said
28
action."
Although a defendant's equitable share of fault under Article
16 is determined only by reference to the liability of parties over
whom the court could indeed exercise jurisdiction, the express
language of Article 16 squarely places the burden of demonstrating that such entities were not amenable to suit upon the
29
plaintiff.

26 Id. There are exceptions that restore joint and several liability, for example,
acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of others." See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(7)
(McKinney 2001). Thus, although a defendant may be held less than fifty percent
liable, should an exception apply, Article 16 will not govern the molding of the
judgment.
27 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 2001).

28

Id.

See Zakshevsky v. City of New York, 562 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1990) ("Unless plaintiff meets the additional burden placed upon it by the
statute, by showing that personal jurisdiction could not have been obtained over a
party, plaintiff runs the risk of obtaining a partial recovery.").
29
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III. NEW YORK ASBESTOS LITIGATION
Typically, in asbestos personal injury cases, there are
numerous entities for which a jury will be asked to apportion
liability. The number of entities on a verdict sheet can be
daunting and may include many entities which have previously
filed for bankruptcy. 30 Article 16 requires the plaintiff to
attempt "with due diligence" to "obtain" jurisdiction over a fault
sharer. 3 ' Under New York law, personal jurisdiction is obtained
by serving a summons and complaint on a party.32 According to
plaintiffs in these actions, service of process cannot be made
upon bankrupt defendants because of the automatic stay
provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 33 Courts have
agreed with this position:
As a technical matter entities which have filed petitions for
bankruptcy are subject to suit, but the automatic stay precludes
processing a claim against them. No amount of diligence could
result in the plaintiff bringing bankrupt parties into this
litigation; hence it does not appear that their share should be
4
considered pursuant to Article 16.3
Non-settling defendants desire to allocate liability among as
many defendants as possible to reduce their own liability shares.
Defendants will thus emphasize the exposure to the settled
defendants' products to build up the settled parties' shares,
thereby reducing their own share.35 Plaintiffs, on the other
hand, have an incentive to ensure that the jury allocates the
bulk of liability between the unsettled defendants and the
parties that plaintiffs could not obtain jurisdiction over, in an
attempt to have the unsettled defendants found liable for as
30 See supra, notes 6 and 8.
31 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601(1) (McKinney 2001).
32 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 304, 305, 311 (McKinney 2001).

33 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000) ("[A] petition filed under [the Bankruptcy
Code] ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of--(1) the commencement or

continuation... of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against
the debtor.... ").
34 In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 846 (2d Cir. 1992)

(citation omitted).
35 See In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 624 N.E.2d 979, 983-94 (N.Y. 1993)
(holding that under N.Y. General Obligations Law section 15-108(a), a non-settling

tortfeasor is entitled to have its liability reduced "either by the total of the dollar
amounts to be paid by the settling defendants or the total dollar amounts of their
corresponding shares of the verdict, allocated in accordance with their apportioned

liability, whichever is greater").
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large of a share as possible. Accordingly, plaintiffs attempt to
skew the product identification evidence toward the remaining
36
defendants as well as the bankrupt entities.
Although a claimant may testify as to a variety of products
he or she claims to have been exposed to, the number of entities
considered for purposes of blame allocation is not limited merely
to the testimony of the plaintiff. A share of blame can be
indirectly and circumstantially proven through invoices and coworker testimony.37
Thus, at major worksites, such as
powerhouses and shipyards, there are an array of entities
against which a jury may be asked to apportion liability. Such
apportionment will be based upon both product exposure and the
38
magnitude of fault.
36 See G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd,

179 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240-41

(S.D.N.Y. 2001). There may be ethical considerations that arise. A plaintiffs trial
strategy might very well be geared toward the goal of forcing a defendant to pay
more than their several share by manipulating the product identification evidence
(presenting to the jury only the evidence of those whose shares they believe will be
picked up by the defendant). Since the parties in summation are allowed to argue
percentages to the jury, plaintiffs can appear quite reasonable by stating that the
remaining defendants should be apportioned ten percent of the blame and the other
(bankrupt) defendants fifty percent, knowing that defendants may pay more if the
bankrupts are allocated higher shares. Since the jury is unaware that apportioning
to the bankrupts might enlarge the unsettled defendant's share of liability, the
plaintiff has a free hand in appearing reasonable while a defendant in summation
may look unreasonable in arguing for apportionment. Id.
37 See In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d at 837 (holding that
New York law does not require the plaintiff to identify the exact manufacturers
whose product injured each plaintiff); Kreppein v. Celotex Corp., 969 F.2d 1424,
1426 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that the plaintiff was exposed to defendant's
asbestos products based partly on witness testimony and plaintiffs job duties);
O'Brien v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 944 F.2d 69, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
circumstantial evidence alone may suffice as proof); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899
F.2d 1281, 1286-87 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a reasonable jury could infer that
defendant's product was a factor in plaintiffs injury where plaintiff presented
"unusually detailed circumstantial" evidence).
38 See Kreppein, 969 F.2d at 1426-27 ("[L]iability should be apportioned
according to relative degrees of fault for the injury, which may include not only the
strength of the causal link but also the magnitude of the fault." (citing Garrett v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 447 N.E.2d 717, 719 (N.Y. 1983))). Often, apportionment of
blame may be based, at least in part, on the magnitude of fault. There is substantial
fault evidence against many of the entities which filed for bankruptcy in the early
years of asbestos litigation (juries found that the conduct of these entities was
reckless and awarded punitive damages, thereby contributing to their bankruptcy),
and plaintiffs' counsel is able to present such evidence when making their case,
thereby arguing that these companies deserve to be apportioned a substantial
allocation of fault based upon their conduct. Ironically, then, a viable defendant may
pay more than its share of liability due to the conduct of the bankrupts rather than
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The preferred, but by no means uniform, trial format is the
reverse bifurcated method. 39 Under reverse bifurcation, the
damages phase of the trial is conducted before the liability
phase, and the latter phase occurs only if the jury returns a
damages verdict in the plaintiffs favor. 40 If the plaintiff obtains
a finding of liability, the court needs to enter a judgment. It is at
this stage where the interplay of bankrupt defendants and
Article 16 occurs. Nevertheless, each party can still move posttrial prior to the entry of judgment to set aside the
41
apportionment and other findings of the jury.
IV. REALLOCATION OF THE SHARES ATTRIBUTED TO ENTITIES
BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Once a court determines which entities, if any, are indeed
beyond its jurisdiction, the question remains-what happens to
the shares attributable to those entities? Essentially, there are
their own.
39 See Amended Case Management Order No. 1 Governing New York City
Asbestos Litigation, at 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Mar. 22, 2001).
40 See Pioli v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 605 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255 (1st Dep't
1993).
41 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4404(a) (McKinney 2001) ("After a trial... upon the
motion of a party .... a court may set aside a verdict.., where the verdict is
contrary to the weight of the evidence .... ."). The New York Court of Appeals has
held that "the standard for making [the] determination [that the jury's verdict was
against the weight of the evidence], and reviewing it on appeal, was whether 'the
evidence so preponderate[d] in favor of the [plaintiff] that [the verdict] could not
have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence.'" Lolik v. Big V
Supermarkets, 655 N.E.2d 163, 164 (N.Y. 1995) (alterations in original). Where jury
verdicts on apportionment issues are "against the weight of the evidence," courts are
empowered to order new trials pursuant to C.P.L.R. 4404(a). See Glassman v. City
of New York, 640 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (2d Dep't 1996) (holding that a jury's award of
ninety percent liability against the city in a case involving two other individual
defendants was against the weight of the evidence, and that the jury's
apportionment of fault was not based on a fair interpretation of the evidence); Salles
v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 577 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (1st
Dep't 1991) (affirming the granting of defendant's motion to set aside liability
verdict and ordering a new trial on apportionment of liability). Furthermore, where
courts have found a jury's verdict to be "contrary to the weight of the evidence,"
courts have readjusted liability percentages to make verdicts accord more with
reality. See Lemma v. Forest City Pierrepont Assoc., 625 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554-55 (1st
Dep't 1995) (ruling that jury's apportionment of liability was against the weight of
the evidence and ordering a new trial on the issue of apportionment); Fortune v.
Newmark & Co. Real Estate, Inc., 607 N.Y.S.2d 947, 947-48 (1st Dep't 1994)
(ordering new trial solely on issue of apportionment of liability unless parties agreed
to apportionment in the amount of 42.5% and noting that such a reapportionment of
liability "more reasonably reflects the reality of the situation").
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two possible approaches when Article 16 applies and a third
approach when Article 16 is inapplicable.
Under the first approach when Article 16 is applicable, a
defendant would pay no more than the share awarded by the
jury in the event that the court found that plaintiffs failed to
meet their burden of proving that any entities were indeed
beyond the court's jurisdiction.42 New York State Supreme Court
Justice Schackman employed this method in In re New York City
Asbestos Litigation (Maltese),43 an asbestos case tried in New
York County.
Pursuant to the second approach when Article 16 is
applicable, each non-settling tortfeasor is responsible only for its
proportionateshare of the damages attributed to parties outside
the court's jurisdiction, a method employed in In re Joint Eastern
44
& Southern DistrictAsbestos Litigation (McPadden).
Alternatively, where Article 16 does not apply, the share of
the damages apportioned to unavailable tortfeasors is
redistributed only among non-settling tortfeasors. 45 This is the
result because without Article 16's statutorily created liability
cap, the court's only recourse is to utilize New York's traditional
46
rule of joint and several liability.
V. VARIOUS CouRTs' APPROACHES TO ARTICLE 16
Justice Shackman's Judgment in Maltese
In Maltese, Justice Shackman entered a judgment equal to
the amount of liability assigned by the jury without reallocating
the shares of insolvent entities that were purportedly beyond the
court's jurisdiction. The jury apportioned liability among several
entities, as follows: 20% to Westinghouse Electric Corporation;

A.

42 See Zakshevsky v. City of New York, 562 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1990) ("Unless plaintiff... [shows] that personal jurisdiction could not have
been obtained over a party, plaintiff runs the risk of obtaining a partial recovery.").
43 640 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1st Dep't 1996), afftd, 678 N.E.2d 467 (N.Y. 1997).
4 798 F. Supp. 940, 955 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1992).
45 See Austin v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 841 F.2d 1184, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1988)
("There is ... [authority] supporting the redistribution of the liability of an
insolvent or immune tortfeasor among the remaining tortfeasors .... " (citing
Larsen v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 355 N.W.2d 557, 563-64 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984))).
46 See Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 181-82 (N.Y. 2001)
("Prior to Article 16's enactment, a joint tortfeasor could be held liable for the entire
judgment, regardless of its share of culpability." (citing Sommer v. Fed. Signal
Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365 (N.Y. 1992))).
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10% to The Babcock & Wilcox Company; 10% to General Electric
Company; 10% to Worthington Corporation; 5% to Armstrong
World Industries; 5% to Owens Corning Fiberglas Corporation;
30% to Keene Corporation; 5% to Johns Manville; and 5% to
Philip Carey (Celotex). 47 Keene Corporation, Johns Manville,
and Celotex were insolvent at the time of trial. Westinghouse
was the only non-settling defendant. Although the jury found
that Westinghouse had acted recklessly and in concert with
48
others-both circumstances making article 16 inapplicable the trial court set aside both findings pursuant to a post-trial
motion. 49 Thus, since the judgment did not fit within an
exception to Article 16, the article applied. 50 Accordingly,
Westinghouse, as the non-settling defendant, was not held
jointly and severally liable and instead was required to pay only
its equitable share.
The order of judgment indicates that the jury assessed
damages of $1,600,000 in favor of the Estate of Mario Maltese,
and judgment was entered against Westinghouse in the amount
of $301,280 with interest, an amount corresponding roughly to
the percentage of liability given to Westinghouse by the jury
(20%). Significantly, no portion of the damages representing the
shares of the bankrupt defendants (40% or $640,000) was
reallocated to Westinghouse. 51 The award remained undisturbed
on appeal. Evidently, plaintiffs never requested the court to
reallocate the bankrupt shares to Westinghouse, and the issue
52
was not argued on appeal.
B.

Judge Sifton's Approach in McPadden

'In McPadden, Judge Sifton expressly applied Article 16 to
limit plaintiff's recovery for non-economic damages. 53 There,
John Crane-Houdaille ("Crane"), the only defendant to go to a
47 See Order of Judgment, In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 640 N.Y.S.2d
488 (1st Dep't 1996) (No. 57266) (on file with author).
48 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1602(7), (11) (McKirmey 2001).
49 See In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 678 N.E.2d at 468.
50 See id.

51 See Order of Judgment, In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 640 N.Y.S.2d
488 (1st Dep't 1996) (No. 57266) (on file with author).
52 See In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 678 N.E.2d at 468.
53 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 798 F. Supp. 940, 944 (E.D.N.Y.
& S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[Ihe McPadden case involves Article 16 of New York's
[C.P.L.R.], which limits the plaintiffs joint and several recovery for non-economic
losses ...").
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final verdict, was assigned ten percent of the overall liability by
the jury. 54 In calculating Crane's equitable share under Article
16, Judge Sifton first separated out the percentage of liability
55
attributed by the jury to non-diverse and bankrupt entities.
The parties agreed that "both bankrupts ...and defendants
whose New York state residence prevents the Court from
exercising diversity jurisdiction over them.., are not subject to
56
the Court's jurisdiction for Article 16 purposes."
Crane's equitable share of 24.1% of the damages was
established by dividing its apportioned share of liability (10%) by
the total amount of liability attributed by the jury to Article 16
fault sharers (41.5%). 57 The decision reveals that most of the
Article 16 fault sharers had settled with the plaintiff prior to
verdict. 58 Nonetheless, Crane was held liable for non-economic
losses. 59 Crane was thus required to absorb a proportionalshare
of the damages attributed to bankrupt and non-diverse
60
defendants, not the entire share.
C. The Approach When Article 16 Is Inapplicable
A major cause of the confusion surrounding the treatment of
unavailable shares is that reported decisions addressing issues
of reallocation often involve cases not subject to Article 16.61 In
54 See id. at 945.
55See id. at 958.
56 Id. at 956. Of course, the fact that a remaining defendant agreed that
bankrupt defendants were beyond jurisdiction reduces the significance of the ruling

because it was not the product of vigorous litigation but rather stipulation of the
parties.
57 Id. at 958-59.
58 Id. at 951.
59 See id. at 960.
60 On appeal, the Second Circuit did not review Judge Sifton's application of
Article 16. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 995 F.2d 343, 344 (2d Cir.

1993) (reversing the district court and ordering a new trial based on admission of
evidence prejudicial to Crane).
61 See In re New York Asbestos Litig. (Consorti), 847 F. Supp. 1086, 1109

(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that Article 16 was not applicable because the evidence
substantiated the jury's findings of reckless conduct and concerted action, both of
which are statutorily created exceptions to Article 16), affd in part and rev'd in

part, 72 F.3d 1003 (2d Cir. 1995); In re E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp.
1380, 1401 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that time-barred actions revived
under tort reform legislation "were explicitly exempted from the strictures of Article
16 limiting the liability of persons jointly responsible for causing injury"), affd, In re
Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992); In re New York
City Asbestos Litig., 572 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991) (involving
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1986, as part of general tort reform, the legislature changed the
statute of limitation for products-related personal injury actions.
Under the new rule, plaintiffs have three years from the date
they discover their injury to file actions in order to recover
damages allegedly caused "by the latent effects of exposure to
any substance." 2 Under the prior practice, such causes of action
accrued at the date of exposure. Actions time-barred under the
old rule, however, were revived, provided they were re-filed
within one year from the effective date of the act (July 30,
1987).63 Although Article 16 was inapplicable to the revived
cases at issue in In re New York City Asbestos Litigation
(Anciewicz), the trial court held that under General Obligations
Law (GOL) section 15-108, "shares attributed to the bankrupt
defendants are distributed among various other defendants
found liable by the jury in proportion to their respective shares
of liability."64 The appellate division, however, in rejecting the
lower court's proportional redistribution method, observed that
"nothing in [GOL] § 15-108 suggests that it was intended to
compromise the principle of joint and several liability in tort."65
Thereafter, without reference to Article 16, the First Department
held that "[t]he share of damages attributable to bankrupt
nonsettling
be
allocated.., among
should
defendants
defendants. "66
Although plaintiffs would argue that Ancewicz, which was
affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals without comment,
buttresses their argument that unavailable shares are allocated
solely amongst non-settling defendants, the First Department
merely corrected the lower court's error in applying tort reform
principles in a case where Article 16 was clearly inapplicable.
Thus, the decision stands only for the proposition that in cases
not subject to Article 16, non-settling defendants will be

consolidated cases, all of which were subject to the revival statute, thereby making
Article 16 inapplicable), affid as modified in part and rev'd in part, In re New York
County Asbestos Litig. (Anciewicz), 593 N.Y.S.2d 43, 50 (1st Dep't 1993), af/d, 625
N.E.2d 588 (N.Y. 1993).
62 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney 2001).
63 See 1986 N.Y. Laws 682 § 4 at 1567; see also In re E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 772 F. Supp. at 1401 (noting that all of the cases were subject to the revival
statute).
64 In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 572 N.Y.S.2d at 1009.
65 In re New York County Asbestos Litig. (Anciewicz), 593 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
66 Id. at 50.
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responsible for any shortfall between the GOL section 15-108
offset and the total verdict. Insofar as Article 16 governs the
molding of the judgment in these three cases, the holding of
Ancewicz is inapplicable.
In sum, if Article 16 applies, a defendant's liability is capped
at its equitable share. Alternatively, if Article 16 does not apply,
non-settling defendants will be jointly and severally liable for the
shortfall between the GOL section 15-108 offset and the amount
of damages awarded by the jury.
VI. WHY THE MCPADDENAPPROACH SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED
Of the bankrupt entities that may be deemed beyond the
jurisdiction of a court, two distinct categories can be discerned:
(1) bankrupt entities that have not established settlement trusts
and (2) those that have established settlement trusts. There are
various ways to analyze these two categories of entities.
A.

A Trust May Be Amenable to Suit
If a trust exists, the document which governs the claims
procedures must be reviewed. It is possible that the trust allows
suits against it as long as certain conditions are satisfied, such
as filing a claim and opting for arbitration prior to filing suit.
Should a trust allow itself to be sued, it would be unfair to
consider the bankrupt beyond jurisdiction.
A non-settling
defendant should not be prejudiced by a plaintiff's strategic
decision not to pursue the trust in the tort system.
B.

Trusts That Pay Claims

Regardless of whether a trust contains a provision allowing
lawsuits, if a trust pays claims, it should not be considered
beyond jurisdiction. Although trusts typically pay a fraction of
the amount the pre-bankrupt defendant would have settled for,
that factor should not lead to a "beyond jurisdiction" finding
because the financial ability of an entity does not impact on the
issue.
C. Bankrupt Entities Without a Trust
A more difficult issue arises when a bankrupt entity has no
trust. As discussed above, there are significant legal arguments
militating in favor of not treating such defendants as "beyond
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jurisdiction."
conclusion.

In addition, there are policy reasons for this

D. A Trust May Be Amenable to Suit
Notwithstanding the federal courts' opinion that a bankrupt
entity is not amenable to suit, and thus beyond the effective
jurisdiction of the plaintiffs, a review of various bankrupt
entities indicates that various trusts provide for a claimant's
67
ability to file a law suit against the trust.
1.

Johns Manville

In 1994, the Johns Manville Corporation reorganization plan
was amended. 68 The Johns Manville Personal Injury Trust
("Manville Trust") was created to bear all asbestos liability for
Manville for injuries arising out of exposure to Manville
products. To process such claims, the Manville Trust established
a Trust Distribution Process ("Manville TDP") which governs the
filing of claims for injuries arising out of exposure to Manville
products. Pursuant to the Manville TDP, plaintiffs retain the
right to sue the Manville Trust. To do so, a plaintiff must
initially file a claim with the Trust. If a plaintiff rejects the offer
and non-binding arbitration is rejected, plaintiff has the absolute
right to file a lawsuit. The Manville TDP provides that "[olnly
claimants who, following individual evaluation, elect nonbonding arbitration and then reject their arbitral awards retain
the right to trial against the Trust of the liquidated value, if any,
of their claims."69
Thus, since claimants enjoy the right to pursue tort claims
against the Manville Trust, it can hardly be considered "beyond
jurisdiction." A plaintiffs decision not to pursue those claims
should not prejudice a defendant so that the Manville share is
considered "beyond jurisdiction."
2.

Celotex
The Celotex Trust is the entity which receives asbestos

67 See In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 670 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738-39 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1998).
68 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 481, 484
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
69 Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
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personal injury claims on behalf of Celotex Corporation. 70 The
Celotex Trust's Personal Injury Claims Resolution Procedures
("Celotex Trust Procedures") states:
Only claimants who opt for non-binding arbitration and then
reject their arbitration awards retain the right to a jury trial to
determine the liquidated value of their Asbestos Personal
Injury Claims against the Trust .... A holder of an Asbestos
Personal Injury Claim desiring to file suit against the Trust
may do so only after the rejection of a non-binding arbitration
71
award.
There are similar provisions in other settlement trusts as
well. In one significant ruling, a state court found that a hearing
was necessary on the issue of whether the bankrupt trusts
72
should be considered beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.
While federal court rulings have treated a bankrupt entity as
automatically beyond jurisdiction, the opinion in In re New York
City Asbestos Litigation 3 analyzed the issue of whether trusts
are beyond jurisdiction as one which was conceded by plaintiffs'
74
counsel to be one of first impression in New York State courts.
The court acknowledged that in the federal Brooklyn Navy
Yard case ("BNY") rulings, the Manville trust was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court. However, Justice Lehner analyzed a
subsequent statement made by Judge Weinstein, the author of
the federal BNY ruling, noting:
[Iln a later decision ...

[J. Weinstein]

wrote ... that "the

greatest experts in asbestos litigation who drew up the trust
distribution process ("TDP") disagree as to whether the
provision of this TDP will render the Trust a party over whom
plaintiffs are unable to obtain jurisdiction within the meaning
75
of N.Y. CPLR 1601."

70 See In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586, 602 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
71 THE CELOTEX CORPORATION, SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED ASBESTOS
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS RESOLUTION PROCEDURES § VII.10 (June 17, 1999),
availableat http://www.celotextrust.com.
72 See New York City Asbestos Litig., 670 N.Y.S.2d at 739.

73 Id. at 738 ("[Pjlaintiffs will now be given the opportunity to submit proof on
this issue ... [whether] plaintiffs could have applied to join any corporation (or trust
created by it) as a party defendant.") (emphasis added).
74 See id. at 737 ("[Pjlaintiffs acknowledge that the 'issue of whether, for the
purposes of Article 16, bankrupt entities should be deemed beyond the court's
jurisdiction has never, to plaintiffs' knowledge been directly addressed in any
reported decision by a New York state court.' ").
75 Id. at 738-39.
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The Court noted that the defendant "cited to several cases in
which the Manville trust was sued... and also assert[ed] that
the trust created by Fibreboard Corporation was amenable to
suit."7 6 The court found that a hearing was needed to determine
precisely which entities were subject to the automatic stay. The
court noted:
Plaintiffs have provided the court with no proof in opposition to
these assertions by [defendant] and the record is totally barren
on the issue of whether at the time of trial the bankruptcy
statutory stay was in effect with respect to these entities or the
trusts created by them,
or to any other corporation to whom the
77
jury ascribed fault.
Rather than automatically find that a bankrupt entity is
beyond jurisdiction, a court should examine the settlement trust
agreement.
3.

A Trust That Pays Claims
Numerous settlement trusts have been established to
process claims and pay settlements on behalf of bankrupt
defendants. 78 Although the trusts do not pay "full value" and
often settle claims for a relatively nominal amount, they are
undisputedly paying claims for the injuries caused by the
asbestos manufacturer on whose behalf the trusts were
established. These trusts, insofar as they are available to make
settlement offers to plaintiffs, surely cannot be considered
bankrupt entities.
Plaintiffs may argue that since the trusts pay substantially
less than "market" settlements, they ought to be considered
"beyond jurisdiction." An entity's financial status, however, has
76 Id. at 739. The Fibreboard Corporation previously had its own Trust
Distribution Process ("Fibreboard TDP"). The Fibreboard TDP permitted a claimant
to pursue a recovery through the courts after exhausting alternative trust
procedures. See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 519 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
("If an acceptable resolution still cannot be reached, the claimant may then try the
claim in the tort system .... .") (emphasis added). Although the Fibreboard TDP is no
longer processing claims due to the bankruptcy of Owens Coming Fiberglas (the
latter purchased Fibreboard and subsequently filed for bankruptcy), this is an
example of how some entities considered beyond jurisdiction ought not to be.
Rather, an examination of the Trust rules is required to ascertain whether a given
trust can be sued.
77 New York City Asbestos Litig., 670 N.Y.S.2d at 739 (emphasis added).
78 See In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); In re Joint E.
& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 479 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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no bearing upon the applicability of Article 16. In Washington v.
City of New York, 79 the court refused to require a defendant to
pay more than its twenty percent share of a $750,000 verdict,
notwithstanding the fact that the other defendant, which was
found to be eighty percent liable, was required by law to fund no
more than $10,000 of the underlying award.8 0 The plaintiff
argued that Article 16 should be held inapplicable to the "20%
defendant" in light of the legal limitations of recovery on the
claim against the "80% defendant," but the court rejected
plaintiffs argument. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 16, the
court refused to require the "20% defendant" to pay more than
20% of the underlying verdict.
Although observing that
"[p]laintiffs contention distills to one of equity and fairness," the
court noted additionally that "[iut could also be argued, however,
that it is inequitable to require [the "20% defendant"] to pay for
what is in the main someone else's wrong."8'
In its final analysis, the Washington court stated:
But, more fundamentally, equitable considerations simply have
no standing in the interpretation of Article 16. Sometimes a
statute has inequitable consequences, but if they do not rise to
constitutional dimension, and in the Court's view they do not,
redress may be sought only from the Legislature.... It is
important to keep in mind that we are dealing here with the
interpretation of a statute, not with common law. Section 1601
provides that the liability of a joint tortfeasor found to be 50%
or less at fault is limited to that defendant's proportionate
share of fault. If equitable considerations were to play a part,
82
the statute's effect could unravel into uncertainty.
Just as the Washington court refused to require a solvent
defendant to absorb the share of a financially compromised
defendant, it can be argued that in light of the New York State
cases interpreting Article 16 as pertaining solely to personal
jurisdiction and the language of C.P.L.R. 1601, which contains
no "insolvency" exception, a defendant ought not to be burdened
with another entity's share of blame simply because plaintiffs
cannot obtain more than a certain amount.

79 608 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1994).
80 Id. at 612 (stating the uninsured "80% defendant" was represented by the

Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation [MVAIC]).
81 Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 611-12.
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An argument can be made that it is simply inequitable to
allow plaintiffs to collect settlements from distribution trusts yet
not allow defendants to use the liability shares attributed to
such entities as a means of reducing their liability. Although the
federal courts have implicitly held that a defendant's share
should not be reduced by the culpability attributed to entities as
to whom there was truly no means of recovery whatsoever (e.g.,
where a plaintiff is unable to lift or modify a bankruptcy stay
and cannot consequently recover any compensation from a
bankrupt tortfeasor), the drafters of Article 16 simply could not
have anticipated that the jurisdictional restriction of Article 16
would be applicable to entities such as the various trusts. Such
an interpretation simply constitutes a windfall to plaintiffs as
well as defeats the legislative aim of Article 16.
4.

Bankrupt Entities Without a Settlement Trust

Although the plain language of Article 16 is silent regarding
whether a bankrupt entity is to be considered beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff-the party seeking to avoid
the application of Article 16-bears the burden of proving that it
could not, through the exercise of due diligence, have obtained
jurisdiction over the bankrupt defendants.8 3 The question of
whether such an entity is beyond jurisdiction is more difficult
when there is no trust, as discussed below. Nonetheless, there
are significant reasons for holding that such an entity is not
beyond jurisdiction.
VII. NON-ASBESTOS CASES REQUIRE A SHOWING THAT
PLAINTIFFS WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN IN PERSONAM
JURISDICTION OVER AN ENTITY

New York case law requires the inclusion of all culpable
persons on the verdict sheet, regardless of whether or not they
are parties.8 ' Included within this panoply of persons will likely
be defendants not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
Unfortunately, the plain language of Article 16 is silent as to
what qualifies an entity as being beyond jurisdiction. There is
83 See Rezucha v. Garlock Mech. Packing Co., 606 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (Sup. Ct.
Broome County 1993).
84 See Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 (N.Y. 1972); see
also Gannon Pers. Agency, Inc. v. City of New York, 394 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1st Dep't
1977).
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simply no mention in the statute whatsoever regarding the type
of jurisdiction-be it subject matter jurisdiction or personal
jurisdiction-which must be lacking in order for an entity to be
5
outside the court's jurisdiction.8
Notwithstanding the statute's silence, in non-asbestos cases,
New York courts have interpreted Article 16 as requiring the
showing of a lack of in personam jurisdiction. For example, in
Duffy v. County of Chautauqua,6 the Fourth Department held
that Article 16's limitation on liability was only inapplicable in
instances where the plaintiff could demonstrate the requisite
inability to obtain personal jurisdiction over an entity.8 7
Although the Duffy court observed that New York's Workers'
Compensation Law precluded co-workers from suing one
another, the court further noted that a co-worker's fault "would
ordinarily be considered for apportionment purposes under
CPLR 1601." 88 Recognizing that "[t]he term 'jurisdiction' in
CPLR 1601(1), therefore, refers to personal rather than to
subject matter jurisdiction," the court observed that "the
statutory bar of the Workers' Compensation Law does not
constitute the inability to obtain jurisdiction as intended by
section 1601."89 Thus, since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
the requisite inability to achieve personal jurisdiction over the
decedent/co-worker (the plaintiff could have served a representative of the decedent's estate), the decedent's culpability
would have been a factor in apportioning liability, even though
New York's Workers' Compensation Law precluded co-workers
from suing each other. Such a substantive limitation merely
implicated the court's subject matter jurisdiction and was not
within the intended meaning of Article 16's jurisdictional
restriction.
Additionally, in Rezucha v. Garlock Mechanical Packing
Co.,90 the court held that the jurisdictional restriction upon
limited liability under Article 16 was grounded in notions of

85 Legal scholars have noted that Article 16 is poorly drafted. See, e.g., Vincent
C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW
YORK ANNOTATED § 1602, 615 (2001).

86 649 N.Y.S.2d 297 (4th Dep't 1996).
87 See id. at 301.
88 Id. at 300.
89 Id. at 300-01.

90 606 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1993).
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personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. 91 The issue
in Rezucha was whether the liability share attributed to the
State of New York, which was immune from suit in Supreme
Court, could be taken into account under Article 16 in reducing
the shares of other defendants. In particular, the decedent, on
behalf of whom the plaintiff sued, died from injuries sustained
during the course of his employment with the State University of
New York. Pursuant to C.P.L.R. 1601, plaintiff sought to
preclude the introduction by the defendant of evidence of
culpable conduct by the State of New York. Because the State of
New York was immune from suit in Supreme Court, the plaintiff
alleged that the state was an entity over which plaintiff could
not obtain jurisdiction. Consequently, plaintiff argued that "any
determination of culpable conduct on [the state's] part would not
reduce any defendant's liability under the statute."92
The
Rezucha court, while acknowledging the state's immunity to suit,
stated:
[Tihe feature which precludes consideration of a non-party's
culpability under section 1601 is the lack of personal, rather
than subject matter, jurisdiction. Here the State's immunity
from suit is better viewed as a limitation on the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court rather than as a restriction
on plaintiffs ability to make service and obtain personal
jurisdiction under CPLR 301. Since the statute has been read
to include a non-party's culpability unless the claimant cannot
obtain personal jurisdiction, a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction93does not necessarily implicate the jurisdictional
restriction.
Adopting the foregoing interpretation of Article 16, the
Rezucha court held that "proof of the State's culpable conduct
will be permitted and its proportional share will be included in
the consideration of whether CPLR 1601 reduces any defendant's
94
liability for non-economic loss to that defendant's actual share."
Courts interpreting Article 16 have consistently held that
plaintiffs must demonstrate an inability to obtain personal
jurisdiction over such entities, not the type of subject matter
95
jurisdictional impediments posed by automatic stays.
91 See id. at 972.

Id. at 970.
Id. at 972 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
94 Id. at 973.
95 With respect to interpretations of state statutes, New York courts should be
92
93
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One legal commentator has observed that the correct result
was reached in Rezucha and that an "inability to obtain
jurisdiction" generally conjures up the image of an out-of-state
tortfeasor over whom no basis of long-arm jurisdiction exists. 96
Federal courts have embraced an opposite policy. In the
consolidated federal BNY trial decision, 97 the court affirmed the
trial court's ruling that bankrupt entities subject to automatic
stays are parties over whom jurisdiction cannot be obtained
pursuant to Article 16.98 However, the basis of the decision is
really that the plaintiffs cannot obtain "effective" jurisdiction
over the defendants.
Without the "effective" requirement,
ostensibly even according to the federal courts, there would be
jurisdiction. The automatic stay does not deprive a court of
jurisdiction. 99 Courts have interpreted Article 16 as requiring
effective jurisdiction, but such a reading is questionable.
As discussed above, courts have uniformly held that the
language of Article 16's jurisdictional restriction contemplates an
inability to obtain personal jurisdiction over an entity. Insofar
as 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) vests the federal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings, the New York
Supreme Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such

guided by decisions of New York appellate courts, rather than federal courts,
notwithstanding the fact that the sole appellate authority is from a different judicial
department than the one in which the case is heard. See Mountain View Coach
Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919-20 (2d Dep't 1984) According to the
court:
The Appellate Division is a single statewide court divided into
departments for administrative convenience and, therefore, the doctrine of
stare decisis requires trial courts in this department to follow precedents
set by the Appellate Division of another department until the Court of
Appeals or this court pronounces a contrary rule.
Id.(citation omitted). Thus, the Fourth Department's decision in Duffy, and other
New York state cases, are the best source of precedent on the issue of jurisdiction
for purposes of Article 16.
96 See
Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, MCKINNEY'S
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED § 1601, 608 (2001).

97 In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992).

See id. at 845-56.
99 See, e.g., Holland v. High Power Energy, 248 B.R. 53, 56 (S.D. W. Va. 2000)
("[Ajutomatic stay provisions ... merely suspend proceedings and do not divest the
district court of subject matter jurisdiction."); Kleinsleep Prods. v. McCrory Corp.,
708 N.Y.S.2d 296, 297 (2d Dep't 2000) (asserting that an automatic stay "did not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the action commenced but merely suspended
the proceedings").
98
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matters. 0 0 Clearly, the bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction
over matters involving insolvent entities implicates a court's lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
The insolvent status of a
tortfeasor, however, says nothing with respect to whether such
an entity is likewise beyond the personal jurisdiction of New
York courts. Just as the Rezucha court permitted the defendants
to reduce their equitable share by the share attributed to the
state, an entity over which the Rezucha court clearly lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, courts should not automatically
consider bankrupt entities beyond jurisdiction. The federal
courts' view that insolvent entities are beyond the jurisdiction of
the court for purposes of Article 16 is inconsistent with state
court rulings.
In his commentaries to Article 16, Professor Alexander
states the following:
It seems clear, however, that the proviso was intended to
exclude a nonparty's share of fault only in situations in which
the nonparty is someone over whom no basis of personal
jurisdiction exists. The fact that a nonparty may have some
special defense under the substantive law which, as a practical
matter, would make joinder futile, does not seem to be a proper
basis for excluding the nonparty's share of fault. 1 1
The commentaries refer to the federal BNY opinion and note
that according to the federal ruling, bankrupts were considered
excludable because of the absence of "effective" jurisdiction.
Professor Alexander asks "whether the Legislature intended to
equate practical limits on the ability of a court to exercise
10 2
jurisdiction with an inability to obtain jurisdiction."
Professor Alexander also cites with approval the ruling in
Rezucha v. Garlock Mechanical Packing Co. He states that the
correct result was reached in Rezucha. "In further support of the
100 See Morrison v. Budget Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 657 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (2d
Dep't 1997) (recognizing that personal jurisdiction pertains to a court's power to
exercise control over the parties, and that subject matter jurisdiction constitutes an
absolute restriction on a court "in terms of its statutory or constitutional capacity to
adjudicate particulartypes of suits") (emphasis added).
101 Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED
LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED § 1601, at 606 (2001) (citing Duffy v. County of
Chautauqua, 649 N.Y.S.2d 297 (4th Dep't 1996) and Washington v. City of New
York, 608 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1994)).
102 Id. at 607 (finding that dissolution of corporate tortfeasor does not preclude
the obtaining of jurisdiction (citing Dominguez v. Fixrammer Corp., 656 N.Y.S.2d
111 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1997))).
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court's conclusion, it can be argued that a plaintiffs inability to
sue the State in Supreme Court is not an inability to obtain
substantive law
jurisdiction, but rather is the result of a rule of
10 3
based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity."
No court has addressed the issue of whether any attempts
were made to lift or modify the automatic stay applicable to
these insolvent entities. 10 4 Without even attempting to lift or
modify the stay, it can be said that plaintiffs have not put forth
the requisite due diligence regarding their attempts to exercise
jurisdiction over the bankrupt entities. Of course, requiring
plaintiffs to attempt to modify or lift the stay in every asbestos
case would be difficult. Nonetheless, without even attempting, it
cannot be demonstrated that plaintiffs could not, with due
diligence, obtain jurisdiction over bankrupt defendants.
CONCLUSION

In New York, the effect of bankrupt defendants on judgment
molding can be far reaching and can obscure the relative
responsibility of a defendant. Presuming that a defendant does
not come within an exception to Article 16, the idea that an
unsettled defendant would have to absorb the asbestos liability
of another defendant defies a significant legislative intent of
103

Id. at 608.

One court, however, ordered a hearing to determine whether stays were in
effect that prevented suit and that plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that
a stay prevented them from obtaining jurisdiction over the parties, ruling as follows:
[Defendant] argues that in light of such state of the record, plaintiffs have
failed to meet the due diligence burden placed on them by § 1601, and
further that they have failed to plead the existence of any exemption from
the limitation on liability provided therein. While plaintiffs never
submitted any proof as to which entities the bankruptcy statutory stay
applied, it was always clear that there was a legal issue open with respect
to the apportionment of the shares of fault of the corporations who had
filed for bankruptcy protection. Therefore, plaintiffs will now be given the
opportunity to submit proof on this issue, and a decision on the molding of
the judgments is held in abeyance pending a hearing before a special
referee to hear and report as to which corporations, to which the jury
ascribed fault, were subject to a bankruptcy statutory stay at any time
subsequent to September 1, 1995. Said date, which was 5 months prior to
the trial of the damages portion of these actions, is selected as I find that
plaintiffs could have applied to join any corporation (or trust created by it)
as a party defendant if any applicable stay had expired prior to that time
and a viable claim existed.
In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 670 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1998).
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Article 16, impedes settlement, and raises potential ethical
concerns.
It would seem that a defendant deemed to be responsible for
five percent of the harm suffered by a plaintiff should be
required to pay no more than five percent of the damages. By
introducing evidence as to bankrupt entities, however, and
focusing the jury's attention on their culpability, an unsettled
defendant may be asked to pay a portion of the bankrupts' share.
Thus, the legislative goal of preventing deep pockets from being
targeted is thwarted.
Moreover, given the financial losses associated with the
asbestos litigation and the potential impact on non-settling
defendants, Article 16 issues pose unique challenges to
remaining defendants. As more defendants enter bankruptcy, a
considerable sum of money is no longer "on the table." This
places additional pressure on the remaining defendants to "make
The dramatic increase in settlement
up" that difference.
to
an environment in which prior
demands contributes
settlement values do not resolve cases.
Finally, there are ethical concerns relating to the
presentation of evidence to the jury. Counsel has an incentive to
manipulate the evidence before the jury and can appear quite
reasonable to a jury by blaming the bankrupt defendants, all the
while building up the share of liability of the viable unsettled
defendant.
A different approach is clearly needed. The ruling in In re
New York City Asbestos Litigation was a significant step forward
in moving away from an automatic finding that bankrupts were
beyond jurisdiction. By acknowledging that there were issues
with respect to whether trusts could be sued and whether they
could pay claims, the court appreciated that the simple reaction
of placing bankrupts in the "beyond jurisdiction" category was
not correct.
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